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Abstract—The consumer UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) mar-
ket has grown significantly over the past few years. Despite its
huge potential in spurring economic growth by supporting vari-
ous applications, the increase of consumer UAVs poses potential
risks to public security and personal privacy. To minimize the
risks, efficiently detecting and identifying invading UAVs is in
urgent need for both invasion detection and forensics purposes.
Given the fact that consumer UAVs are usually used in a civilian
environment, existing physical detection methods (such as radar,
vision, and sound) may become ineffective in many scenarios.
Aiming to complement the existing physical detection mecha-
nisms, we propose a machine learning-based framework for fast
UAV identification over encrypted Wi-Fi traffic. It is motivated
by the observation that many consumer UAVs use Wi-Fi links for
control and video streaming. The proposed framework extracts
features derived only from packet size and inter-arrival time
of encrypted Wi-Fi traffic, and can efficiently detect UAVs and
identify their operation modes. In order to reduce the online
identification time, our framework adopts a re-weighted `1-
norm regularization, which considers the number of samples and
computation cost of different features. This framework jointly
optimizes feature selection and prediction performance in a
unified objective function. To tackle the packet inter-arrival time
uncertainty when optimizing the trade-off between the detection
accuracy and delay, we utilize Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MLE) method to estimate the packet inter-arrival time. We
collect a large number of real-world Wi-Fi data traffic of eight
types of consumer UAVs and conduct extensive evaluation on
the performance of our proposed method. Evaluation results
show that our proposed method can detect and identify tested
UAVs within 0.15-0.35s with high accuracy of 85.7-95.2%. The
operation mode of UAVs can be accurately identified in the range
of 88.5-98.2%.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, we have seen a significant growth
of the consumer unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) market for
personal recreation. Despite its huge potential in spurring
economic growth, the significant increase of consumer UAVs
raises lots of issues regarding airspace management, public
security, and personal privacy [1]. It was reported that an
Army chopper was struck by an illegally flying drone over
a residential neighborhood in September 2017 [2]. In April
2016, a UAV was peeping outside a teenager’s bedroom
window in Massachusetts [3]. In January 2015, a small UAV
crashed on the white house lawn bringing the worry about
security measures [4].
To deal with these threats, consumer UAV registration
mechanisms, started by Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), have been promoted worldwide, which can help law
enforcement officials to handle the UAV and its owner infor-
mation [5]. UAV-restricted zone and geo-fencing are requested
to set up in sensitive areas, such as airports, nuclear facilities,
and data centers, to protect them from hostile UAV invasion.
However, the enforcement of regulations is not an easy task
in practice. Plenty of UAVs are still unregistered, and many
UAVs do not have geo-fencing or the geo-fencing can be
turned off easily. There is an urgent need to quickly detect
an intruder UAV in a restricted area, or assist the forensics
investigation to identify its appearance and operation mode.
An ideal detection technique should give us the alert when the
restricted area is invaded by unwanted UAVs at the earliest
stage. After that, counter-measures for intruder UAVs can
be applied and the UAV owner may be tracked or located.
Therefore, how to efficiently detect the consumer UAVs is of
utmost importance.
Other than detecting UAVs, identifying UAVs’ operation
mode will be very useful for forensics purposes. Being able
to identify the operation mode of intruder UAVs can help
investigators to restore the course of the incidents, which could
be used as court evidences in a legal process and help law
enforcement officials to improve countermeasures or responses
to various possible UAV incidents.
Although many traditional physical detection mechanisms,
such as radar [6], [7], acoustic [8], [9], and vision [10], [11],
[12], have been proposed for UAV detection, they cannot
always work in practical scenarios, especially in a crowded
urban environment. The identification accuracy of radar may
be influenced by other small flying objects, such as birds. The
radar signals can also be easily blocked by walls, buildings,
and other obstacles, which are very common in a civilian
environment. The vision detection technique cannot detect the
UAV in non-line-of-sight scenarios, which are very common
in urban areas. The acoustic detection can be interfered by
environment noises. For example, electric weed whackers may
also produce sound quite similar to UAV rotors. The noisy
environment in the city could also overwhelm the relative
small sound produced by tiny rotor-craft or gliding fixed-wing
UAV.
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Aiming to complement the above conventional physical de-
tection mechanisms, we propose to explore machine learning-
based Wi-Fi traffic identification approaches to achieve fast
UAV detection and operation mode identification. It is moti-
vated by the observation that many existing consumer UAVs
are equipped with Wi-Fi interfaces and communicate with a
user handheld device (e.g., smartphone) for command control
or video streaming. Detecting UAVs through wireless traffic
identification brings us several advantages over traditional
mechanisms. First, Wi-Fi signal sensing and packet capturing
are not affected by obstacles, other flying objects, acoustic
noise, or light conditions that could affect traditional physical
detection mechanisms. Second, Wi-Fi data traffic provides
cyber information about UAVs’ type and their operation mode
which can be very useful for forensics investigation.
Challenges: At the same time, UAV detection through
Wi-Fi traffic identification introduces unique challenges that
separate it from traditional traffic identification [13], [14], [15]
and sensing tasks as follows:
1) UAV traffic can be encrypted. Therefore, existing
network monitoring and intrusion detection mechanisms
that are based on packet header examination or port
filtering are not applicable to encrypted UAV traffic. For
example, Wi-Fi controlled UAVs (such as DJI and Bebop
drones) use WPA2 to secure the wireless communication.
Although SSID in the MAC frame may reveal information
about the type or vendor of the drone, it can be easily changed
through drone control Apps. 2) Existing machine learning
methods cannot be directly used to identify UAV traffic in a
timely manner. For realtime applications, we need to identify
the UAV as soon as it is appearing in or approaching to a
restricted area. From learning and classification perspective,
traditional machine learning methods [13], [14] that only
aim at minimizing detection error cannot be directly applied.
Detection delay introduced by the online computations on
feature generation and future packet arrival time should also
be considered. 3) Traditional time series early detection
strategies [16] cannot be applied to UAV traffic. The inter-
packet arrival time of UAV traffic is random, so the traditional
time series early detection method which is based on fixed time
intervals cannot be directly applied.
Approaches: To address the above challenges, we pro-
pose a delay-aware machine learning-based UAV detection
framework to strike a tunable balance between UAV detection
accuracy and delay. Our classification framework treats the
encrypted data flow as a time series and extracts statistical fea-
tures only based on the packet size and inter-arrival time. By
considering the computation time among different features, our
framework adopts a re-weighted `1-norm regularization and
integrates feature selection and performance optimization in
one objective function. To tackle the packet inter-arrival time
uncertainty when estimating the delay cost function, we use
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method to estimate the
packet inter-arrival time. Finally, expected total cost function
integrates misclassification/misdetection and delay cost which
are updated online when a new packet arrives and an optimal
detection decision is made to minimize the expected total cost
function.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a machine learning-based framework to
achieve delay-aware UAV detection and operation mode
identification over encrypted Wi-Fi traffic. This frame-
work extracts features derived only from information of
packet size and inter-arrival time. This framework can be
applied to other types of encrypted traffic, such as cellular
traffic or proprietary protocol traffic as long as the packet
size and interval can be measured.
• In order to reduce the model prediction time for fast UAV
detection, our framework adopts `1-norm regularization
and integrates feature selection and accuracy optimization
in one objective function, which considers the feature
importance and difference of computation time among
different features.
• We propose to use model-based MLE method to estimate
the packet inter-arrival time. Then using the mean square
error (MSE) as a well-known metric, we evaluate the
performance of the estimation on the collected real-world
dataset.
• Other than detecting and identifying different types of
UAVs, our proposed method further identifies the UAV’s
operation mode such as standby, hovering, flying, etc.
• We collect a large amount of real-world encrypted Wi-
Fi data traffic of non-UAV and eight types of consumer
UAVs, and conduct extensive evaluations on the perfor-
mance of the proposed methods.
Through comprehensive study, we obtain the following
findings:
• The UAV traffic presents different patterns from non-UAV
traffic. Therefore, machine learning based methods work
well to differentiate UAV traffic from a wide range of
non-UAV traffic.
• Due to vendor specific implementation of UAV command
control and video streaming protocols, different types of
UAVs present different traffic patterns which can be used
to classify UAVs from different vendors.
• The UAV Wi-Fi traffic presents different patterns under
different UAV operation modes. This finding implies a
strong correlation or coupling between cyber information
(data traffic) and physical information (operation mode)
of UAVs. This finding is expected to motivate new cyber-
physical defense and forensics mechanisms that leverage
this cyber-physical coupling. We believe this methodol-
ogy can be applied to other cyber-physical systems and
motivate more in-depth study on cyber-physical attack co-
detection or co-defense for many IoT (Internet of Things)
applications, such as connected cars, smart home, smart
healthcare, and industrial control systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II dis-
cusses the related work. Problem setup is described in Section
III-A. Sections IV presents our proposed method on delay-
aware UAV early detection and operation mode identification.
Collection and analysis of real-world dataset is described in
Section V. Extensive performance evaluation is conducted in
Sections VI. Section VII provides more detailed discussions on
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some practical aspects of the proposed methodology. Section
VIII concludes this paper and discusses the future work.
II. RELATED WORK
A. UAV Detection Mechanisms
Existing UAV detection mechanisms mainly focus on phys-
ical sensing through various means, including radar, vision,
and acoustic.
Radar system is one of the well-known and oldest tech-
niques in aircraft detection dating back to World War II. In
order to adapt the detection of small size UAVs, X-band radar
systems were proposed [17], [18]. However, in metropolitan
areas (e.g., a city) with lots of buildings and obstacles, radar
based detection may become ineffective due to its line-of-
sight requirement [19]. The detection accuracy could also be
impacted by other small flying objects such as birds.
The vision-based UAV detection based on video cameras
[10], [11], [12], [20] has the same weakness as radar based
techniques, as it also requires line-of-sight between the camera
and UAV.
The acoustic signal-based UAV detection is a method that
can solve the out-of-sight problem [8], [9], [21]. However,
this method has its own drawbacks as well. First, the acoustic
signal coming from the UAV can be quite noisy due to
the noise generated at the motors of electric-powered rotor-
craft with fixed wings [22]. Second, other similar acoustic
signal generating devices such as electric weed whackers can
generate sound signals quite similar to UAV’s. Moreover, the
relatively low power acoustic signal generated by the tiny
rotor craft or gliding fixed wing UAV can be overwhelmed by
the environment noise in metropolis areas making the UAV
undetectable.
In order to overcome the drawbacks of individual tech-
niques, hybrid solutions have been proposed by combining
the acoustic sensor and video camera [23]. Another hybrid
solution incorporates the radar sensor as well [24].
A recent work [25] has been proposed to detect the ap-
proaching of a UAV within a short distance through the
observation of received signal strength (RSS) changes of Wi-
Fi signals. However, an intruder UAV may just launch inside
a restricted area and hover, or standby on a neighboring
roof to spy on someone. In these scenarios, this method
will not work. Moreover, a changing RSS is not necessarily
introduced by UAVs, but could be other moving objects with
Wi-Fi interfaces, such as mobile users carrying smartphones
or a driving car equipped with Wi-Fi connections. So the
application scenario of this proposed technique is quite limited.
In another work [26], the authors propose a new RF-based
drone detection method based on the physical characteristics
of the drone, such as body vibration and body shifting, which
impact the wireless signal transmitted by the drone during the
communication. This method is not useful when the UAV is
in the standby mode. Moreover, both [25] and [26] require
line-of-sight connection between the RF signal monitoring
system and UAV. Our proposed method based on Wi-Fi traffic
identification relaxes this strong assumption.
In another recent work [27], UAV’s RF signal characteristics
are extracted and an artificial neural network (ANN)-based
detection algorithm is proposed. Three statistical features
(slope, kurtosis and skewness) of the received RF signals are
employed in training and testing phase of the ANN. However,
the detection accuracy of this method suffers from RF signal
strength variation due to the fast fading as a result of multipath
effect especially in the urban area. Moreover, UAV’s mobility
introduces channel fading which eventually changes the RF
signal statistical features and affects the detection accuracy.
B. Data Traffic Classification/Identification
Classical approaches such as port-based, payload-based and
deep packet inspection can be used to identify the type of the
non-encrypted network data traffic. However, nowadays many
application data traffic are encrypted for security purposes, and
our work is closely related to encrypted data traffic classifica-
tion/identification. There are several works for identifying the
encrypted data flow based on protocol data fingerprinting in
wired and wireless networks, where commonly a combination
of statistical and machine leaning approaches have been used
[13], [28], [14], [15], [29].
In [13], a new SVM based method is proposed to identify
three types of traffic, HTTP, FTP, and Email. One of the
pioneering works in this area applies classification techniques
to classify traffic in a wired network into classes of bulk
transfer, small transactions, and multiple transactions [14].
Bernaille et al. [15] show that it is possible to distinguish
the behavior of an application from the observation of the
size and the direction of the first few packets of the TCP
connection. In this work, three classical clustering algorithms,
K-Means, Gaussian Mixture Model and spectral clustering are
applied on the dataset. However, this method requires 1) packet
header traces analysis and 2) initial TCP connection packets.
Xie et al. [28] proposes a new method called ”SubFlow”
(subspace clustering technique), which learns the intrinsic
statistical features of each application to classify and identify
the flow. In a recent work [30], encrypted wireless network
traffic classification is used for intrusion detection.
However, our work is different from the existing traffic
identification works in the following aspects: 1) Our model
provides packet-by-packet analysis, hence the decision is made
in a timely manner as packets enter the detection system. 2)
Our model adaptively finds the optimal number of the packets
that are needed for optimal identification with high accuracy,
while considering time cost (or delay). 3) When training the
model, feature generation time is also considered and critical
features are selected. Therefore, in the prediction, useless
features are not generated, and thus the prediction runtime
is reduced.
Compared to our earlier work [31], in this paper, operation
mode of the detected UAV is identified. To do so, we collect
a large amount of real-world operation mode data traffic
of four UAVs and apply multiclass classification machine
learning algorithms to identify the modes. We also extend our
delay-aware UAV detection test from four to eight commonly
used consumer UAVs and conduct extensive evaluations on
the performance of the proposed methods. Moreover, we
provide performance evaluation for the packet inter-arrival
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Figure 1: System model
time estimation using MLE. The results indicate that mean
square error of estimation is reduced when the information
of a large number of packets are available in the detection
system.
C. Wireless Device Fingerprinting
Wireless device fingerprinting techniques have been pro-
posed to differentiate wireless devices of the same type
or different types [29], [30], [32], [33]. It can be broadly
classified into three categories: software-based, RF-based, and
location/channel-based fingerprinting [34].
Software-based fingerprinting is based on the observation
that depending on the combination of the chipset, firmware,
and device driver, different Wi-Fi devices may exhibit different
MAC layer behaviors (e.g., different beacon intervals). How-
ever, the Wi-Fi adapter on a UAV may use the same hardware,
firmware, and device driver as those on a mobile device (e.g.,
smartphone). Thus, this fingerprinting technique will not be
effective to identify UAVs.
RF-based fingerprinting is based on the fact that different
wireless transceivers emit RF signals with distinctive fea-
tures/patterns in analog and modulation domains. However,
this technique usually requires a static channel with low noise,
such that the distinctive RF features can be correctly extracted.
It is very challenging to apply this technique to detect UAVs
in mobile scenarios.
Channel/location-based fingerprinting is based on the princi-
ple that channel state information (CSI) and RSS are location-
specific due to path loss and channel fading. So devices at
different locations present different CSI or RSS profiles, then
can be identified. This technique is usually applied in static
scenarios where the user moves slowly or is fixed at a location.
However, UAVs can emerge at an unknown location and move
randomly. So this technique is not suitable to identify UAVs.
III. PROBLEM SETUP
A. System Setup
There is a Wi-Fi signal sensing and packet capturing system
that can collect all the Wi-Fi traffic within a physical sensing
range in realtime. There can be multiple Wi-Fi users in the
sensing range and multiple UAV or non-UAV devices. The
sensing system may capture non-encrypted packets, for which
we assume the system can tell the application types of the cor-
responding flow by examining the packet headers or contents.
Since these non-encrypted packets can be easily identified by
existing methods, we will only focus on encrypted Wi-Fi traffic
in this paper. For an encrypted Wi-Fi frame, the information
we can obtain about the frame is its source and destination
MAC addresses, transmitter and receiver MAC addresses,
packet size, and packet arrival time together with other MAC
header information, such as frame type (control, management,
or data), sequence number, and duration/connection ID.
In this paper, we mainly focus on two sequential tasks. 1)
Wi-Fi controlled UAV detection: There are a large body
of such kind of UAVs on the market, such as DJI, Bobop,
DBPower drones, etc. We assume the Wi-Fi communication
between the drone and controller (e.g., smartphone) is en-
crypted using security protocols, such as WPA2 and we aim
to detect the intruder UAV in a timely manner (see Fig. 1).
2) UAV operation mode identification: For any UAV type(s)
detected in the first step, further identify their operation mode.
Operation mode consists of standby, hover, forward, backward,
and etc.
For the UAV detection and operation mode identification,
we only use data frames. We divide the encrypted Wi-Fi
traffic into individual flows according to the pair of source
and destination MAC addresses. A unique flow includes the
packets between a pair of nodes. The traffic in a flow can be
bi-directional or unidirectional. In a realtime scenario, these
flows usually interleave with each other in time. The goal of
this paper is to identify the UAV data flows when frames are
captured and decide the UAV type and its operation mode in
a quick manner with high accuracy.
B. Delay-aware UAV detection Problem Formulation
The UAV detection over encrypted Wi-Fi traffic can be
formulated as a machine learning classification problem. Let’s
assume that we can obtain a large training dataset with m
flow traces with each trace having n consecutive packets.
The traces contain UAV and non-UAV flows which are la-
beled with their corresponding flow types yi ∈ Y , where
Y = {UAV1,UAV2, ...,UAVυ−1, non-UAV} and υ = |Y |
denotes the number of class types in set Y . UAVj for
j ∈ {1, ..., υ − 1} denotes the UAV type j.
Packet size and packet inter-arrival time are two key at-
tributes we extract from these traces for UAV detection and
operation mode identification. The sequences of packet size
and packet inter-arrival time for the ith trace are denoted by
xi and τ i, respectively. Now, let xi = (xi,1, · · · , xi,n) where
xi,j for i = 1, ...,m and j = 1, ..., n indicates the size of the
jth packet in the ith trace. Similarly, let τ i = (τi,1, · · · , τi,n)
where τi,j denotes the inter-arrival time between the jth and
(j + 1)th packets (j < n) in the ith trace. Define a finite
set S = {((xi, τ i), yi)}i∈{1,...,m} where the pair (xi, τ i)
represents the packet size and inter-arrival time of the ith trace
in set S, respectively.
Let x˜(tk) denotes the received incoming traffic up to its
kth packet arrived at time tk. Assume a set of multiclass
classifiers H = {hjγ}j∈{1,...,n} are trained to classify the
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Figure 2: Delay-aware UAV detection and operation mode
identification workflow.
incoming traffic flow x˜(tk) where γ ∈ Y . When the Wi-Fi
sensing system receives a new packet of the incoming traffic
flow x˜(tk), its new features are extracted and incorporated
in the prediction system. Intuitively, as more packets arrive,
more accurate information about the traffic can be gained.
On the other hand, collecting more packets introduces longer
identification delay. Therefore, there is a trade-off between
detection accuracy and delay in the detection process.
Let C1(yˆ, y˜) : Y×Y → R denotes the test misclassification
cost function where (yˆ, y˜) ∈ Y , and yˆ = hjγ(x˜(tj)) is the
predicted class label, while the true class label of the incoming
flow is y˜. And, let C2(tp) ∈ R, p > k, be the time cost
function which indicates the time cost value if UAV detection
is postponed up to time instant tp. Thus, the estimated total
cost function is given by
J(x˜(tk)) = C1(h
k
γ(x˜(tk), y˜)) + C2(tk). (1)
In order to find an optimal trade-off between the detection
accuracy and delay, the total cost function J needs to be min-
imized. Hence, we formulate the delay-aware UAV detection
optimization problem as follows:
p∗ = arg min
p∈{k,...,n}
J(x˜(tp)), (2)
where p∗ indicates the optimal number of the packets that
need to be received from the incoming flow before performing
the UAV detection decision, and tp∗ denotes the p∗th packet
arrival time. When p∗ = k is the solution of the optimization
problem in (2), there is no need to collect more packets
because J(x˜(tk)) < J(x˜(tq)) for q = k + 1, ..., n. Therefore,
the detection is performed instantly at time tp∗ = tk. However,
Table I: Statistical features (sample size N = 100).
Function: Feature Name Description Comput. time
V1(x): mean x¯ = 1N
∑N
i=1 x(i) 0.672 µs
V2(x): median The higher half value of a data sample. 4.365 µs
V3(x): MAD1 MAD = median(|x(i)−median(x)|) 8.346 µs
V4(x): STD2 σ =
√
1
N−1
∑N
i=1(x(i)−mean(x))2 1.608 µs
V5(x): Skewness γ = 1N
∑N
i=1(x(i)−mean(x))/σ)3 14.917 µs
V6(x): Kurtosis β = 1N
∑N
i=1(x(i)−mean(x)/σ)4 14.095 µs
V7(x): MAX H = (Max(x(i))|i=1...N ) 0.464 µs
V8(x): MIN L = (Min(x(i))|i=1...N ) 0.652 µs
V9(x): Mean Square MS = 1N
∑N
i=1(x(i))
2 1.147 µs
V10(x): RMS RMS =
√
ms(x) 1.273 µs
V11(x): PS3 3(mean(x)−median(x))/σ 8.011 µs
V12(x): MAD4 MAD = 1N
∑N
i=1 |(x(i)−mean(x))| 2.531 µs
1 MAD: median absolute deviation
2 STD: standard deviation
3 PS: Pearson Skewness
4 MAD: mean absolute deviation
when p∗ 6= k is the solution of (2), it means that the total cost
is minimized for k+1 ≤ p∗ ≤ n, thus the detection process is
deferred to collect more packets from incoming flow. For the
notation purposes, let the indicator function I(p∗) = 1 when
p∗ = k; and otherwise I(p∗) = 0, where p∗ = k corresponds
to the UAV detection at time tp∗ .
C. UAV Operation Mode Identification Problem
In the second task, for the detected UAV, we further identify
the UAV’s operation mode. Eight UAV operation modes are
labeled as Z ={“Standby”, “Hover”, “Forward”, “Backward”,
“Up”, “Down”, “Right”, “Left”}. In this problem, using exist-
ing machine learning algorithms a set of multiclass classifiers
are trained packet-by-packet on a real-world dataset to mini-
mize the total operation mode misidentification cost.
IV. DELAY-AWARE UAV DETECTION AND OPERATION
MODE IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we propose a delay-aware learning-based
predictive model in order to solve the problem formulated in
(2). Then, we extend our work to further identify the operation
mode of the detected UAV. Figure 2 illustrates the main
workflow for both the proposed delay-aware UAV detection
and operation mode identification methodologies.
A. Learning-Based Model Design
Based on the definition of traffic flow dataset S in Section
III-B, we further define the data of “incomplete traffic flow”,
where only the first j < n packets are available in the dataset,
denoted as Sj = {((xji , τ ji ), yi))}i∈{1,...,m},j∈{1,...,n} where
xji = (xi,1, xi,2..., xi,j) and τ
j
i = (τi,1, τi,2, ..., τi,j) indicate
the sequence of packet size and inter-arrival time of the ith
trace in the jth subset, respectively. Next, for each dataset Sj ,
we generate a design matrix of Xj = [Xj1 , X
j
2 , ..., X
j
m]
T ∈
Rm×2l, where Xji ∈ R2l is a row vector as
Xji =
[
V1(x
j
i ), V2(x
j
i ), ..., Vl(x
j
i ), V1(τ
j
i ), V2(τ
j
i ), ..., Vl(τ
j
i )
]
,
and V1(·), ..., Vl(·) are functions which compute the statistical
features of the input samples (i.e., xji , τ
j
i ). l denotes the
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Algorithm 1 Training phase framework for UAV identification
Input: Wi-Fi traffic trace dataset {(xi(tn), yi)}, (yi, γ) ∈ Y ,
υ = |Y|, i ∈ {1, ...,m}, j ∈ {1, ..., n};
Output: Ej(Xji ), W
j , set of classifiers H =
{
hjγ
}
;
Step 1: Extract packet size and inter-arrival time of encrypted Wi-Fi traffic traces and
create dataset S = {((xi, τ i), yi))};
Step 2: Define subsets Sj =
{
((xji , τ
j
i ), yi))
}
, where
xji = (xi,1, xi,2..., xi,j) and τ
j
i = (τi,1, τi,2, ..., τi,j);
Step 3: Determine design matrices Xj = [Xj1 , X
j
2 , ..., X
j
m]
T , where
Xji =
[
V1(x
j
i ), ..., Vl(x
j
i ), V1(τ
j
i ), ..., Vl(τ
j
i )
]
∈ R2l;
Step 4: Train a set of classifiers H =
{
hjγ
}
by solving (3):
min
Wj
L(y, hjγ(Xj ,W j) +
∑2l
i=1 λ
j
i |W ji |;
Step 5: Compute expected training misclassification function:
for i ∈ {1 : m}
for j ∈ {1 : n}
for γ ∈ {UAV1,UAV2, ...,UAVυ−1, non-UAV}
Compute Pj(yˆ = γ|Xji ;W j) = hjγ(Xji ,W j)
Compute Ej(Xji ) using (4).
number of features. A list of statistical feature functions with
their associated computation formula is shown in Table I.
Feature selection based on re-weighted `1-norm by
considering both feature discriminative power and compu-
tation time cost: Different features have different significance;
we use W j = {W j1 ,W j2 , · · · ,W j2l} ∈ R2l to denote the
weight vector of jth subset for all the 2l features. Therefore,
W ji = 0 means the ith feature of jth subset is not useful
and can be discarded. Then, given the jth design matrix Xj
and y ∈ Y , our problem is to learn a predictive mapping
hjγ(X
j
i ,W
j) → yi for i = 1, 2, · · · ,m such that: 1) the
disagreement between hjγ(X
j
i ,W
j) and yi is minimized; and
2) the number of non-zeros in W j is minimized.
Other than the fact that different features have different
discriminative power for identification, we also observe that
different features consume different amounts of computation
time (refer to Table I). Therefore, in the jth subset among
the features that bring the same discriminative power in UAV
identification, we tend to remove the one(s) that consume
more time. This requires us to give personalized penalty on
each different feature. The more time one consumes, the more
penalty it is given. Thus, instead of using conventional `1-
norm regularization [35] that penalizes all the features evenly,
we propose the following new objective loss function with the
re-weighted `1-norm:
min
W j
L(y, hjγ(Xj ,W j) +
2l∑
i=1
λji |W ji |, (3)
where the strength of penalty λji for ith feature in jth
subset is proportional to the computational time for this
feature. Therefore, the objective function in (3) will minimize
misclassification error and enforce some W ji ’s to be zeros,
especially those that consume more computation time. Since
for computing of expected misclassification cost function, we
shall need probabilistic output of the classifier, then we choose
hjγ(·) to be one-vs-all logistic regression function [36]. One-
versus-all logistic regression is a generalized version of the
logistic regression into multi-class classification.
Table II: Empirical and exponential CDF Goodness-of-fit statistics
UAV type
Bebop 1 Bebop 2 Spark UDI
KS1 0.0612 0.0508 0.0773 0.0811
CvM2 0.0720 0.0633 0.0691 0.0794
UAV type
Discovery Tello TDR Wingstand
KS1 0.0801 0.0622 0.0910 0.06741
CvM2 0.0865 0.0890 0.0533 0.0695
1 KS: Kolmogorov-Smirnov
2 CvM: Cramer-von Mis
Figure 3: Cumulative distribution function (CDF) plot to
compare the fit of exponential distribution to the empirical
CDF of packet inter-arrival time.
Next, we compute the training expected misclassification
cost function on each trace i for every subset j as follows:
Ej(Xji ) =
∑
yi∈Y
P (yi|Xji )
∑
yˆ∈Y
Pj(yˆ|Xji ;W j)Cj(yˆ|yi), (4)
where P (yi|Xji ) = 1 if yˆ = yi and 0 otherwise. We can learn
a set of one-vs-all logistic regression classifiers H = {hjγ} for
j = 1, ..., n and γ ∈ {UAV1,UAV2, ...,UAV1−υ, non-UAV} in
the training phase. Based on the probabilistic output of one-
vs-all logistic function, we can compute Pj(yˆ = γ|Xji ;W j) =
hjγ(X
j
i ,W
j). And, Cj(yˆ|yi) denotes the misclassification cost
function of training dataset. Cj(yˆ|yi) = 1 if yˆ = yi and
0 otherwise, and yˆ = max
γ
hjγ(X
j
i ,W
j). We summarize the
model training phase for UAV identification in Algorithm 1.
B. Delay-aware Predictive Model
1) Expected missclassification cost function C1: In the
prediction phase of the incoming flow x˜(tk), in order to com-
pute the expected misclassification cost function C1, Ej(X
j
i )
is weighted based on the incoming traffic’s Euclidean distance
from every trace in the training dataset. Consider x˜(tk) be
the incoming flow and X˜k ∈ R2l its corresponding feature
values. The weight function is defined as a normalized sigmoid
function by fkwi = s
k
i /
∑m
i s
k
i where s
k
i = 1/1 + exp
−η∆ki ,
and η is some positive constant, and ∆ki = D¯i − dki /D¯i is the
normalized average distances between X˜k and all the traces
in the training dataset [16]. dki = ||X˜k −Xki ||2 indicates the
Euclidean distance of the incoming flow from ith trace in the
dataset. In fact, the weight function fkwi plays the role of a
similarity function which measures how close the incoming
traffic flow is to each of the traces in the training dataset.
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Algorithm 2 Delay-aware UAV identification
Input: Incoming traffic flow x˜(tk), Ej(Xji ), W
j , H =
{
hjγ
}
,
i ∈ {1, ...,m}, j ∈ {1, ..., n}, γ ∈ Y , (µ1, ..., µυ);
Output: tp∗, p∗, yˆ = max
γ
hkγ(X˜
k
i ,W
k);
Step 1: Extract packet sizes x˜k and inter-arrival times τ˜k of x˜(tk), then compute
statistical feature values X˜k;
Step 2: Compute ∆ki and weight function f
k
wi
;
Step 3: Compute C1 using (5);
Step 4: Identify the trace label which has minimum distance with X˜k . Pick the
corresponding class inter-arrival time from [µ1, ..., µυ], then compute C2
using (10);
Step 5: Calculate expected total cost function J using (1);
Step 6: Compute (2), if p∗ = k then, I(p∗) ← 1 (perform UAV detection) and
break; otherwise k ←− k + 1 and go to Step 1;
Hence, the expected misclassification cost function for x˜(tk)
is defined as follows:
C1(h
k
γ(x˜(tk), y˜)) =
m∑
i=1
fkwiE
k(Xki ). (5)
The above equation indicates that more weights are multiplied
to the training expected misclassification value of the ith trace
if its distance from the incoming flow is larger and vice versa.
2) Estimated time cost function C2: For the incoming flow
x˜(tk), future packet arrival times are unknown and random.
This uncertainty in packet arrival times introduces difficulties
in constructing a delay-aware UAV identification algorithm. In
order to tackle to this challenge, we propose to estimate the
incoming flow’s future packet inter-arrival time according to
the exponential distribution with parameter µˆi for i = 1, ..., υ
achieved by MLE [37] method. In Table II, we present the
goodness-of-fit statistics to show that exponential distribution
provides a good approximation for packet inter-arrival time
estimation. For the illustration purposes, we also graphically
show the goodness-of-fit for Bebop 2 and DJI Spark in Fig. 3.
Exponential distribution parameter estimation using
MLE: Let {T in} be a sequence of n independent and iden-
tically distributed (IID) exponential random variables. Thus,
T ij ∼ Exp(µi) has a probability density function (pdf) of
fT i(τ ij) = µiexp(−µiτ ij) for τ ij ≥ 0 with parameter µi, where
j = 1, ..., n, i = 1, ..., υ and υ = |Y |. Given the data sequence
{T in}, our goal is to estimate the average packet inter-arrival
time (i.e., µi). Since T ij for i = 1, ..., υ and j = 1, ..., n are
assumed to be i.i.d., then the likelihood function is given by
L(µi; τ i1, ..., τ in) =
n∏
j=1
fT i(τ ij ;µi) = µ
n
i exp
−µi n∑
j=1
τ ij
 .
(6)
By taking log of both sides in Eq. (6), we obtain the log-
likelihood function as
l(µi; τ
i
1, τ
i
2, ..., τ
i
n) = nln(µi)− µi
n∑
j=1
τ ij . (7)
Then, maximum log-likelihood estimation of µi is achieved
by solving the first order maximization problem of
µˆi = argmax
µi
l(µi; τ
i
1, τ
i
2, ..., τ
i
n) (8)
Figure 4: UAV types used in the experiment
as ddµi l(µi; τ
i
1, τ
i
2, ..., τ
i
n) = 0, which results in
µˆi =
n∑n
j=1 τ
i
j
for i = 1, ..., υ. (9)
Next, we estimate the packet inter-arrival time of the in-
coming traffic flow x˜(tk), through the following steps: First,
the Euclidean distance between x˜(tk) and each trace in the
training set is computed. Second, the class label of the trace
which has a minimum distance from the incoming flow is
identified. Third, the average inter-arrival time of the identified
class is selected from (9) to estimate the packet inter-arrival
time of x˜(tk) using exponential distribution.
Now, let τ˜i+1 = ti+1 − ti for i = k, ..., n be the packet
inter-arrival time of the x˜(tk) estimated by the above steps.
Then, the estimated time cost function is obtained as
C2(tp) =
p∑
i=k
τ˜i+1 for p = k, ..., n (10)
where C2(tp) is a strictly increasing function.
3) MLE performance metric: We use mean squared error
(MSE) metric to measure the performance of the parameters
estimated by MLE. Considering an incoming traffic flow x˜(tk)
and letting τi+1 for i = k, ..., n be the true packet inter-arrival
time of x˜(tk), we have
MSEp =
1
n− p
n∑
i=p
(τi+1 − τ˜i+1)2 for p = k, ..., n (11)
where MSEp denotes the mean square estimation error of
packet inter-arrival time of x˜(tk) when pth packet arrives.
4) Estimated expected total cost function J: According
to (1), the total cost function J is defined based on C1 and
C2 which can be computed using (5) and (10), respectively.
Algorithm 2 summarizes the total cost function estimation
and incoming traffic flow’s identification phase.
C. UAV Operation Mode Identification
We identify eight common operation modes for consumer
UAVs in the market which are labeled as Z ={“Standby”,
“Hover”, “Forward”, “Backward”, “Up”, “Down”, “Right”,
“Left”}. UAVs’ operation mode is based on the type of
the command they receive from the controller. Each UAV
operation mode produces a distinct traffic pattern in the Wi-Fi
network. This pattern depends on the type of the command
issued by the controller which governs different packet size
and inter-arrival time in the trace. Therefore, a multiclass
7
Figure 5: UAV traffic data collection setup
classification model trained on a suitable dataset can identify
a UAV’s operation mode. Given a dataset which contains a
specific UAV’s Wi-Fi traffic traces labeled with the operation
modes mentioned in set Z , two well-recognized multiclass
classification algorithms, support vector machine (SVM) and
random forest (RF) are applied to creat the discriminative
model. In order to achieve a high discriminative power for the
classifiers, the best model parameters are tuned using cross-
validation techniques. Then, the incoming traffic flow x˜(tk) is
given as an input to the corresponding multiclass classifier to
identify the operation mode of the detected UAV.
V. DATA COLLECTION AND PREPARATION
A. UAV Detection Dataset
We collect eight types of consumer UAVs’ traffic flows
shown in Fig. 4: Parrot Bebop 1 Quadcopter Drone (Be-
bop 1), Parrot Bebop 2 Quadcopter Drone (Bebop 2), DJI
Spark (Spark), DBPower UDI U842 Predator FPV (UDI),
DBPOWER Discovery FPV (Discovery), DJI Tello (Tello),
Tenergy TDR Phoenix Mini RC Quadcopter Drone (TDR),
and Wingsland Mini Racing Drone (Wingsland). Figure 5
illustrates our data collection system setup. We use a DELL
Latitude laptop embedded with a wireless network interface
card (NIC), Intel Corporation Wireless 8260, operating in
promiscuous mode to monitor and collect the Wi-Fi network
traffic. For each UAV type, we collect the UAV traffic while
they are flying and streaming video to the controller. To do
so, we set the channel frequency of the monitoring sensor
in the same channel as the UAV’s operating channel, then run
Wireshark version 2.4.11 [38] to capture the Wi-Fi traffic data.
Each UAV type dataset contains 3,000 traffic traces with each
trace having n = 200 consecutive packets.
After collecting the data and identifying the UAVs’ traffic
flows, we clean the data and prepare it for the training and
testing dataset. In the data cleaning phase, we remove all
the broadcast packets (e.g., 802.11 beacon frames), damaged
packets and packets with only receiving address (e.g., 802.11
ACK frames). The remaining packets include video streaming,
control commands, UAV’s response to the control commands,
and UAV status updates such as direction, velocity, height
and GPS information. In Fig. 6, we show the packet size
distribution of the UAV types used in our experiment.
Figure 6: Packet size distribution of different UAVs: x and
y axes denote packet size and probability density distribution
(PDF), respectively.
B. Non-UAV Dataset
In an effort to make a diverse non-UAV dataset, we create
a dataset which consists of two main sub-dataset: First, we
use the Wi-Fi data traffic available online from CRAWDAD
database [39]. We choose this dataset because of the following
reasons. 1) This dataset consists of live and non-live video
streaming traffic captured from commonly seen popular ap-
plications such as Google Hangouts, ooVoo, Skype, TED and
Youtube. 2) The traffic data are collected from a smartphone
app where the user makes a diverse set of mobility patterns.
Second, we have also captured encrypted Wi-Fi traffic on a
university campus Wi-Fi network where a mixed multiple traf-
fic types such as video streaming, social network apps, VoIP,
email, web browsing applications are usually running. If the
UAV identification system is setup on the campus, our method
should be able to differentiate UAV traffic from these non-
UAV traffic. The non-UAV dataset (Google Hangouts, ooVoo,
Skype, TED, Youtube and Campus traffic) also contains 3,000
traffic traces with n = 200 consecutive packets.
C. UAV Operation Mode Dataset
In general, consumer UAVs support eight operation
modes as “Standby”, “Hover”, “Forward”, “Backward”, “Up”,
“Down”, “Right” and “Left”.
The following steps are taken for an operation mode data
traffic collection of a specific UAV type: 1) Wi-Fi connection
is established between the UAV and controller. 2) A specific
operation mode command (e.g., “Forward”) is given via con-
troller to the UAV and is held. 3) Wi-Fi medium monitoring
sensor is activated to monitor the wireless channel traffic. 4)
Wireshark is run on the promiscuous mode to capture the
packets. 5) Before releasing the command in the controller,
first, Wireshark is stopped, and then the collected traffic is
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(a) Training and testing accuracy on each subset j (b) F-measure metric (c) Linear discriminant analysis for n = 200
Figure 7: Classification performance evaluation
saved and labeled according to the commanded operation
mode. 7) This process is repeated for all the operation modes
until enough data traffic is collected.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Learning-based Model Performance Evaluation
By randomly sampling the dataset, we split the whole
dataset into training and testing datasets with the ratio of 70%
and 30%, respectively. We create subset Sj for j = 5, ..., 200
by adding packet-by-packet information to each subset j
according to the step 2 in Algorithm 1. Then, we form the
design matrix Xj for j = 5, ..., 200 by extracting 2l = 24
statistical feature values listed in Table I. One-vs-all logistic
regression multiclass classification algorithm with re-weighted
`1-norm technique proposed in (3) is run over each design
matrix Xj .
Figure 7(a) illustrates the accuracy of the classification
algorithm in training and testing on each design matrix Xj .
The shaded areas denote the regions surrounded by one
standard deviation above and below the mean accuracy. The
results show that a mean testing accuracy of higher than 88%
is achieved when the information of fifty or more packets
(j > 50) are available in the subset. The model learning
process also confirms the intuition that as more consecutive
packets are available in the subset, the mean accuracy of
predictive model increases. F-measure (weighted harmonic
mean of precision and recall) for different UAV subtypes and
non-UAV is shown in Fig. 7(b). Average F-measure of higher
than 86% is achieved on the test data which indicates an
acceptable discriminative power of the trained classifiers.
As a closely similar and related multiclass classification
algorithm to one-vs-all logistic regression, we apply linear
discriminant analysis (LDA) statistical method on the dataset
[36]. This method is a generalized version of statistical Fisher’s
linear discriminant analysis. LDA method finds a linear com-
bination of the features to distinguish different classes in the
dataset.The output of this analysis is shown in Fig. 7(c) for
n = 200. Various types of linear feature combination for
different classes are shown in this figure with arrows followed
by its associated feature index ( 1, 2, ... , 24). Successive
discriminant functions in the LDA analysis provides four
proportions LD1 = 0.70, LD2 = 0.1448, LD3 = 0.0480, and
LD4 = 0.0232 which describe the proportion of between-class
variances. It is well visualized in this figure that how UAV
types and non-UAVs are distinguished on LD2 verse LD1 as
a result of the features’ linear combination.
B. Feature Selection and Computation Time
Our objective function in (3) jointly minimizes the miss-
classification error and runtime by discarding useless features.
Figure 8(a) shows the set of selected features for each model
trained on jth subset for j = 5, ..., 200. As it is shown in
the figure, when the sample size is small (e.g., n < 30), all
of the features are selected by the model. This is because,
on the one hand, small sample size does not provide enough
information for the classifier to distinguish different classes
with high accuracy, and on the other hand, it consumes less
amount of time to compute the feature values. However, as
the sample size increases, misclassification error is reduced
and the feature computation time increases which results in
the smaller set of selected features by the algorithm.
In order to evaluate the impact of feature selection method
on the prediction time, we select 1,000 traces uniformly at
random from the UAV dataset and consider them as incoming
flows (i.e., x˜(tk)). Then, we compute the feature generation
time of the flows for k = 5, ..., 200. Fig. 8(b) illustrates the
mean total feature generation time of the flows versus the
number of the packets in the trace with and without feature
selection methods. The shaded areas denote one standard
deviation above and below the mean total computation time.
The results show that as the number of the packets increases,
with feature selection, the mean total feature generation time
oscillates in a non-increasing trend depending on the number
of selected features. However, without feature selection, the
total computation time increases when the number of packets
increases. Therefore, the proposed feature selection method
reduces the prediction runtime despite the fact that the sample
size is increasing.
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(a) Selected (yellow) and discarded (blue) features (b) Total feature computation time features (c) Mean square error
Figure 8: Feature selection and packet inter-arrival time estimation performance evaluation
Figure 9: Delay-aware UAV identification using Algorithm 2
C. MLE Performance Evaluation
For each UAV type, we select 1, 000 traces uniformly
at random from the UAV dataset. We consider the selected
traces as incoming traffic flows. Then, we follow the step 2
in Algorithm 2 to estimate the packet inter-arrival time of
each flow. Using (11), we evaluate the MLE-based estimation
performance. Figure 8(c) shows the mean MSE between the
true and estimated packet inter-arrival time with shaded area
of one standard deviation. The results show that as more
packets arrive, the mean MSE decreases. This means that as
more packets are captured, the cost function C2 estimation
improves as the estimation accuracy of inter-arrival time
enhances. This results in achieving high quality delay-aware
UAV identification.
D. Delay-aware UAV Identification Test
We consider eight types of incoming UAV traffic flows each
belonging to a specific UAV type (i.e., Bebop 1, Bebop 2,
Spark, UDI, Discovery, Tello, TDR, Wingsland), and run the
delay-aware UAV detection algorithm on them. Due to the
space limitation, we only show the test results for Bebop 1 (in
three steps a, b, c) and summarize the outcome in the far right
table in Fig. 9. We show the total cost function optimization
demo of the eight tested UAVs in a video that can be accessed
from [40].
In Fig. 9(a), k = 10th packet arrives at time tk = 20.56ms
and based on the received traffic flow till then, total cost
Table III: Tested UAVs’ identification performance
Traffic E[p∗] E[tp∗ ](ms) E[Pr] (%)
Bebop 1 87 (±8) 160.43 (±10.01) 87.84 (±1.20)
Bebop 2 95 (±13) 151.91 (±18.82) 90.75 (±1.74)
Spark 93 (±11) 142.80 (±15.57) 95.23 (±0.69)
UDI 141 (±21) 350.79 (±23.41) 85.76 (±2.38)
Discovery 94 (±3) 131.11 (±10.42) 92.52 (±0.85)
Tello 72 (±7) 121.65 (±31.30) 93.68 (±1.01)
TDR 68 (±13) 100.77 (±12.75) 89.66 (±2.10)
Wingsland 75 (±18) 92.46 (± 21.22) 94.39 (±1.85)
function J is estimated. In this case, it is estimated that the
minimum total cost function will occur when p∗ = 71th
packet arrives at tp∗ = 139.41ms. Therefore, the decision
for the flow detection is deferred. The far right column of
the table indicates that if the UAV identification is performed
in k = 10, then the identification accuracy will be 42.54%
(Pr = 0.4254). In Fig. 9(b), k = 40th packet arrives at
time tk = 84.75ms. In this case, the algorithm estimates
that the minimum expected total cost function will occur
when p∗ = 74th packet arrives at tp∗ = 142.94ms. If the
identification is performed in k = 40, then with the accuracy
of 68.91% (Pr = 0.6891) the flow will be detected as a Bebop
1 traffic flow. This process is continued until the arrival of
the kth packet for which k = p∗. According to Fig. 9(c),
this condition is satisfied when k = 75th packet arrives at
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Figure 10: Training and testing accuracy of operation mode identification using SVM and RF classification algorithms
Figure 11: Feature importance analysis
tk = 146.42ms for which k = p∗ = 75. In this case, UAV
detection is performed and the detection accuracy is 90.15%
(Pr = 0.9015).
Next, we select 1,000 traffic traces uniformly at random
from the test dataset and test the flows based on the proposed
delay-aware UAV early detection algorithm. Table III shows
the test results where E[p∗] = 1Nγ
∑Nγ
i=1 p
∗
i denotes the
average optimal number of packets, E[tp∗ ] = 1Nγ
∑Nγ
i=1 tp∗i
indicates the average arrival time of p∗th packet,
E[Pr] =
1
Nγ
∑Nγ
i=1 Pri denotes the average detection accuracy
and Nγ is the number of selected traces for class γ where γ ∈
{Bebop 1,Bebop 2, Spark,UDI,Discovery,Tello,TDR,Wingsland}.
The results show that for the eight tested UAV types, our
proposed method can detect and identify the UAVs in average
within 0.15− 0.35s with high accuracy of 85.7− 95.2%.
E. UAV Operation Mode Identification Evaluation
Consumer UAVs’ operation mode capabilities maybe dif-
ferent from each other depending on the vendor specifications
and manufacturing model. Here, for the UAV types, Bebop
1, Bebop 2 and DJI we identify eight common and popular
operation modes as Z ={“Standby”, “Hover”, “Forward”,
“Backward”, “Up”, “Down”, “Right”, “Left”}. However, FPV
does not support the “Hover” mode, so we exclude this mode
from set Z for this type of UAV.
In order to identify the operation mode of these UAVs,
we apply support vector machine (SVM) and random forest
(RF) multiclass classifiers on the collected real-world data
traffic. For each UAV subtype, we train the SVM and RF
predictive model packet-by-packet for n = 10, ..., 300 by
tuning the best model parameters for each subset. For the
SVM classification method, we utilize radial basis func-
tion (RBF) kernel and tune the best model parameters. For
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Figure 12: Operation mode identification confusion matrix, precision, recall and accuracy for different UAV types for n = 300
example, for Bebop 1 operation mode identification when
n = 300, the best model tuned parameters are C = 64
and  = 0.15 with the number of support vector machines
of {173, 139, 142, 131, 126, 174, 150, 142} for each operation
mode in set Z , respectively.
For Bebop 1, Bebop 2, DJI, and FPV the total number of
operation mode traffic traces in the training dataset is equal
to 9600, 9600, 9600 and 8400, respectively. By randomly
sampling the dataset, we split the whole dataset into training,
cross validation and test datasets with the ratio of 60%, 20%
and 20%, respectively. Using 10-fold cross validation repeated
three times the best model parameters are tuned.
Figure 10 illustrates the accuracy of the classification in
training and testing for the four UAV types when SVM and
RF are utilized for operation mode identification. The gray
(darker) and green (lighter) lines denote the mean accuracies of
training and testing with shaded area of one standard deviation,
respectively. Both methods show an acceptable accuracy in
distinguishing the UAVs’ operation modes.
Figure 11 illustrates the results of the feature importance
analysis for various number of packets in the set. We can
see that for different UAVs, different set of statistical features
indicate a higher level of importance. For example, for Bebop
1 operation mode identification, V5(x), V12(x) (Skewness
and MAD of packet size), V17(τ), and V24(τ) (Skewness
and MAD of packet inter-arrival time) are indicating high
importance value. However, for Bebop 2, V4(x), V11(x) (STD
and PS of packet size), V21(τ), V22(τ), V24(τ) (Mean Square,
RMS and MAD of packet inter-arrival time) are showing high
importance value. Therefore, we conclude that operation mode
data traffic pattern varies for different UAVs even with the
same operation mode.
Confusion matrices for operation mode identification of
four tested UAVs when n = 300 is shown in Fig. 12.
This figure indicates the overall performance of the SVM
and RF multiclass classification algorithms. In each confusion
matrix, the diagonal and off-diagonal cells correspond to
operation modes that are correctly and incorrectly identified,
respectively. The right most column of the matrix indicates the
precision (positive predictive value) and false discovery rate, as
the top and bottom values of each cell, respectively. Similarly,
the bottom row of the matrix shows the recall (true positive
rate) and false negative rate, in top and bottom part of each
cell, respectively. Lastly, the cell in the most bottom right of
the matrix, indicates the overall operation modes identification
accuracy and error, respectively.
As the results show, the operation modes of the UAVs can
be accurately identified with high accuracy of 88.5 − 98.2%
through wireless traffic fingerprinting.
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the significance of delay-aware
UAV detection, applicability of the proposed methodologies,
and possible future research topics.
A. Significance of UAV Early Detection
Considering that a consumer UAV can fly at 50-70mph and
some racing UAVs could even fly above 150mph, a delay
of one second will translate to a flying distance of 22m to
66m, which can be significant in practice for incident re-
sponses and safety/privacy protection. Therefore, reducing the
detection delay is paramount important in the UAV invasion
detection application. Furthermore, by identifying the types
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and operation mode of the UAVs, the countermeasures can be
made more specific and efficient. It also provides very useful
information for forensics investigation and help trace down to
the operators or owners of the UAV.
B. Applicability to Other Communication Protocols
This work is based on the observation that many of con-
sumer UAVs utilize Wi-Fi communication protocol for remote
pilot control and video streaming. However, some type of
consumer UAVs (e.g., DJI Phantom, 3DR Solo, Yuneec) may
use other types of custom communication protocols such
as Lightbridge, Sololink and Yuneec protocol. Our proposed
framework is applicable to other types of consumer UAVs
that use different communication protocols. Our framework
works for encrypted wireless traffic and only needs packet
size and inter-arrival time information (no need to use any
packet content information). As long as we can obtain this
information, our framework can be applied to not only detect
the UAV using the proposed delay-aware mechanism, but also
identify its operation mode.
In this paper, the hypothesis is that UAVs present unique
traffic patterns that can be separated from other non-UAV
traffic due to their use of a different set of communication
protocols and physical operation. We believe smart IP camera
and handheld smartphone gimbal using a different set of
communication protocols will be separable from UAV traffic
as well.
C. Recognizing New Types of UAVs
In this paper, we applied supervised learning frameworks
which can classify the known classes (UAVs) appeared in
the training set. It will be interesting to extend our work to
recognize new types of UAVs (unseen classes). It belongs
to the open set recognition problem which is still an open
research problem in machine learning areas. Existing technolo-
gies including [41] could be explored to recognize new types
of UAVs and at the same time reducing the model retraining
overhead. Although only a limited number of types of UAVs
are tested in this work, the proposed framework should be able
to handle a large dataset of different UAV subtypes. Through
experiments, this paper has demonstrated the discriminative
power of the proposed classifier, which indicates the effec-
tiveness of proposed methodologies. The users are free to
adjust dataset to cover different applications on different UAV
subtypes. Through experiments, this paper has demonstrated
the discriminative power of the proposed classifier, which
indicates the effectiveness of proposed methodologies. The
users are free to adjust both UAV and non-UAV dataset to
cover different application scenarios (e.g., university campus,
government building, airport, etc).
D. More Sophisticated Scenarios
The framework developed in this paper could be extended
to tackle more sophisticated scenarios, such as simultaneous
detection of UAVs operating on multiple channels. A more
powerful adversary could even hop among different channels
to escape from detection. Some multi-channel network mon-
itoring mechanisms [42] could be integrated in this scenario.
An intelligent adversary could change its traffic pattern by
injecting packets to avoid being detected. However, this kind
of adversary could be limited by energy budget (i.e., limited
number of packets can be injected due to limited battery capac-
ity) and mission requirement (i.e., genuine command control
packets and video streaming packets cannot be suppressed).
Therefore, an enhanced machine learning model which can
effectively test sub-traffic could still be effective when facing
such an intelligent adversary. Furthermore, investigating the
possibility of combining traffic information and physical layer
information (such as RSS and modulation schemes) to enhance
the identification performance and enable UAV localization is
of great interest.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Detecting and identifying consumer UAVs is of utmost
importance for regulation enforcement, forensics investigation,
public security, and personal privacy protection. To comple-
ment existing physical detection mechanisms, we proposed
a delay-aware machine learning-based UAV detection and
operation mode identification framework over encrypted Wi-
Fi UAV traffic. This framework extracts features from packet
size and inter-arrival time and in the model training phase
adopts re-weighted `1-norm regularization with consideration
of computation time among various features. Therefore, fea-
ture selection and performance optimization are integrated in
one objective function. To deal with packet inter-arrival time
uncertainty when estimating the cost function, we utilized
model-based MLE method to estimate the packet inter-arrival
times of the incoming flow. We collected a large amount
of encrypted Wi-Fi traffic of eight types of consumer UAVs
and conducted extensive evaluation on the performance of
our proposed methods. Experimental results show that the
proposed methods can detect and identify tested UAVs within
0.15−0.35s with the accuracy of 85.7−95.2%. The operation
modes of UAVs can also be well identified with accuracy in
the range of 88.5− 98.2%. The operation mode identification
reveals the cyber-physical coupling property of UAVs. Based
on this coupling, we can infer information on the physical
status (operation mode) of UAVs given information on their
cyber part (Wi-Fi traffic data).
Although this work uses Wi-Fi traffic to detect and identify
consumer UAVs, we believe the proposed machine learning-
based detection framework and methodology are general
enough to be applied to other cyber-physical/IoT systems using
different wireless communication technologies (e.g., Bluetooth
and cellular). We hope this work to shed light on the cyber-
physical attack co-detection or co-defense for many other
CPS/IoT systems.
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